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COMMENTS
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-NEW EMPHASIS
ON THE LAWYER'S NEED TO KNOW: UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED
STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In seeking the advice of legal counsel, the corporation may, out of ne-
cessity, communicate through its representatives confidential secrets
about its conduct in business.' As is the case with individuals, it is well
settled that a corporation may avail itself of the evidentiary privilege
which allows concealment of such confidential communications.2 This so-
1. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1963)
(Kiley, J., concurring), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 928 (1963).
2. 320 F.2d at 323. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 683 (1981); United
States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 234 U.S. 318 (1915); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between an attorney
and his client. Based primarily upon a policy of promoting freedom of consultation between
the client and his legal advisor, it prohibits disclosure without the client's consent. Recog-
nized as an obstacle to the investigation of truth, the privilege should be strictly construed.
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), Judge
Wyzanski set out the following criteria for applying the privilege:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court,
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a law-
yer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for securing primarily either (i) an
opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
Judge Wyzanski's statement in United Shoe is frequently cited as the formulation of the
attorney-client privilege. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir.
1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 383 (D.D.C. 1978); Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1977).
In his treatise on evidence John H. Wigmore phrased the general principle of attorney-
client privilege as follows:
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called attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confiden-
tial communications known to the common law.3 However, its application
in the corporate context has been quite unpredictable for the past twenty
years.4
The identity of the class of representatives who can speak for the cor-
poration and whose communications with corporate counsel should be
protected by the shield of the corporation's privilege is a major issue in
the law of attorney-client privilege which is unique to the corporate cli-
ent. In ordinary dealings between natural persons, the identification of
the parties as attorney and client presents little difficulty.5 The individual
who receives the information and provides the advice is the attorney,
while the one who makes the disclosure and decides on a future course of
conduct based on the attorney's advice is the client.6 In contrast, a corpo-
ration is an abstract legal entity that exists in law as a fictitious person; a
corporation can act and communicate only through its various agents.'
The possibility of a multiplicity of corporate agents, ranging from direc-
tors and officers to employees, all of whom communicate or receive com-
munications on behalf of the corporation, gives rise to the problem of
delimiting the scope of the corporation's privilege. The difficulty of deter-
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
A shorter definition was adopted in Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), where the court noted:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, the communications relevant to that purpose, made in confidence by
the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor except the protection be waived.
Id. at 285.
For a general discussion of the law of attorney-client privilege as it applies to corpora-
tions, see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04] (1979); Annot., 9
A.L.R. FED. 685 (1971); Koback, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339 (1972).
3. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 682. Reference to the existence of the privi-
lege appears as early as the time of Queen Elizabeth I. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290
at 542.
4. See generally Koback, supra note 2; Brown, Attorney-Client Privilege, 28 DRAKE L.
REV. 191 (1978-79); Gerk, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc.
v. Meredith-The Modified Harper & Row Test, 4 J. CoRp. L. 226 (1978).
5. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. See Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 547 (1968).
7. Id. at 547; Koback, supra note 2, at 362.
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mining when a particular agent is speaking to the attorney as a represen-
tative of the client-corporation is a longstanding problem which the Su-
preme Court recently addressed from a novel perspective in Upjohn Co.
v. United States.8
II. BACKGROUND TO Upjohn Co. v. United States
A. Search for a Uniform Approach
Prior to the Upjohn decision, courts had recoginized the need for pre-
dictability and certainty in identifying the boundaries of the corporation's
privilege,9 but had been unable to agree on a uniform "bright-line" stan-
dard to assist counsel in predicting the existence of the privilege and its
applicability to his client.10 Over time three different "bright-line" tests
were developed.
Before the controversial district court decision in Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Association," courts assumed without question that the
privilege applied to corporations. 2 A number of federal courts followed
the "unlimited approach" set out in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.13 Although the communications in question in United Shoe
were made by corporate employees in managerial and policy determining
positions,' 4 the court's statement that communications "by an officer or
employee"15 of the corporation could be privileged has been cited to sup-
port the proposition the communications by anyone affiliated with the
corporation as an employee, officer or director could fall within the privi-
8. 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
9. For a commentary advocating predictability and certainty, see Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970),
where the author notes that "[i]f the privilege is to achieve its purposes of encouraging
communications, the communicants must be able to discern at the stage of primary activity
whether the communication will be privileged." Id. at 426. But see Koback, supra note 2, at
368, where the author states that "[t]he attempt to establish a litmus of automatic applica-
tion must either fail or secure arbitrary results."
10. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Since
the protection against forced disclosure of confidential statements is a privilege and not a
right, the burden is on the party invoking it to show an entitlement to its benefits. Id.
Accord, Virginia Elec. Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 410
(E.D. Va. 1975).
11. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963).
12. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-41.
13. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See note 2 supra.
14. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-41. "Judge Wyzanski's opinion did
not indicate that this was a factor in his decision." Id.
15. 89. F. Supp. at 359.
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lege.'8 This broad range of protection was challenged by the district court
in Radiant Burners which held that a corporation is not entitled to claim
attorney-client privilege. 1  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
lower court aberration."8
The "unlimited approach" of United Shoe accords with the basic pur-
pose of the privilege-encouraging full disclosure to corporate counsel. It
is also quite predictable and easy to apply. The approach, however, is
incompatible with dictum in Hickman v. Taylor,' where the Supreme
Court termed certain employees "mere witnesses" whose statements were
unprivileged.Y' Likewise, the "unlimited approach" can not be reconciled
with the trend towards broad discovery of all information relevant to any
litigation, as dictated by the federal discovery rules.2' These factors, along
with the lingering influence of the district court's pronouncement in Ra-
diant Burners, led to the creation of the "control group" test 2 which was
rejected in Upjohn.
The "control group" test was first articulated in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.2" In addressing the question of whether
16. Zenith Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954); 2 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-41 & n.17 See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 960 (1956).
17. 207 F. Supp. at 773.
18. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
19. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
20. Hickman v. Taylor is best noted for its articulation of the qualified work product
immunity now embodied in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Some commentators have noted the
opinion's additional significance in limiting the scope of the corporation's attorney-client
privilege. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-41; Simon, supra note 16,
at 956; Greenby, Attorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: New
Rules for Applying the Privilege When the Client is a Corporation, 57 N.C. L. REV. 306,
312 n.40 (1979).
Although it did not endorse any particular test or rule to determine which employees
personify the corporate client for the purpose of limiting the scope of the privilege, the
Hickman Court held that statements of employees who are "mere witnesses" are not privi-
leged. 329 U.S. at 508. This language is dictum but it nonetheless indicates that in the
corporate context the privilege is not to be extended to all statements by all employees.
21. Brown, supra note 4, at 192 (citing 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2206 at 607 (1970)); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Another factor in conflict with
the unlimited approach of United Shoe is the heresay exception allowing entry of business
records into evidence. Brown, supra note 4, at 192. See also United States v. De Georgia,
420 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1969).
22. See Koback, supra note 2, at 362; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-
42.
23. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
[Vol. 16:141
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communications of the corporate employee were communications of the
corporate client for the purpose of the corporation invoking its attorney-
client privilege,2 4 Judge Kirkpatrick emphasized that the corporation
must be the party seeking the legal advice when the privileged communi-
cation is made. 5 Judge Kirkpatrick established the following test:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may
be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has
that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he
makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.28
The members of the corporate "control group" were to be distinguished
from other employees whose communications "would be merely giving in-
formation to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the corpo-
ration having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice. 27
A third approach, the "subject matter" test was formulated in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.28 Finding that the "control group"
test 29 was "not wholly adequate13 0 as a means of determining whether the
24. An attorney for Westinghouse had taken the statement of a Westinghouse employee
"in the course of his investigation of facts relating to the pending indictment of the com-
pany" on civil antitrust charges. 210 F. Supp. at 484. See also City of Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
25. 210 F. Supp. at 485. When a corporate employee communicates a fact relative to
pending litigation to an attorney retained by the corporation, the critical question is
whether "[w]hen he does so, is the corporation seeking the advice of the attorney?" In other
words, "was he at the time ... the corporation seeking advice?" If not, then the corporate
employee is a mere witness who "was giving the lawyer information in order that the latter
could advise a client other than himself." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. In essence, communications by agents in the corporate "control group" would be
privileged while those of other employees would be reduced to the status of unprivileged
third party statements. The district court also noted that the "control group" does not nec-
essarily mean upper level management. There may be situations where other employees
would be authorized to make certain decisions after consultations with attorneys, as for
example, when damage claims are settled by the head of the claims department. Id at 486.
28. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971). The plaintiffs in a civil antitrust action against various publishers and wholesal-
ers of children's books sought discovery of memoranda prepared by defense counsel while
debriefing certain persons shortly after each had given testimony before a federal grand jury
investigating the publishing industry. Each person debriefed was an employee or former
employee of one of the various corporate defendants. The district court judge granted the
request for discovery, and the defendants requested mandamus to compel the district court
to vacate its order.
29. "The district judge substantially followed the 'control group' test." 423 F.2d at 491.
30. Id. This suggests that the court did not completely rule out utilization of the "control
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corporation's attorney-client privilege extended to counsel's debriefing in-
terviews of corporate employees,3' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit adopted a new test:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group,
is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to
the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the com-
munication at the direction of his supervisors in the corporation and where
the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corpo-
ration and dealt with in the communication is the performance of the duties
of his employment.3 2
The "subject matter" test, with its emphasis on the subject matter of
the communication, has been called the "more reasoned approach.""3 By
focusing on the circumstances surrounding the disclosure rather than the
type of corporate employee from whom such disclosure emanates, this ap-
proach "affords a much broader sphere of protection to the corporate liti-
gant. '3 4 This test enables the corporate client to protect communications
from all employees who are engaged in the activity which is the subject
matter of counsel's inquiry.3 5
The "subject matter" test has been criticized for being overly broad
and susceptible to abuse. While it encourages disclosure by a great many
corporate employees, it also expands the "zone of silence" surrounding
corporate affairs, thus increasing the likelihood that relevant information
will be shielded from the discovery process.36 A narrower construction of
the scope of this absolute privilege would be more in keeping with the
group" test.
31. The finding was applicable to Decker's communications. He was an employee of
Harper & Row at the time of the debriefing, but not when the civil antitrust action was
filed. The finding does not extend to communications between lawyers and individuals who
at the time of the interview were former employees of the corporation or employees of other
corporations. Id. at 490. The Upjohn court similarly avoided a decision on the applicability
of the privilege to communications by former employees. See note 75 infra and accompany-
ing text.
32. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
33. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978).
34. Note, supra note 9, at 765.
35. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (The "sub-
ject matter" test "encourages the free flow of information to the corporation's counsel in
those situations where it is most needed.").
36. Note, supra note 9, at 766. See 572 F.2d at 609. This test may enable the corporation
to protect from discovey certain factual witnesses' statements which might be otherwise dis-
coverable on a showing of special need or special circumstances. 4 MooRE.'s FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 1 26.60[2] at 26-238 n.17 (2d ed. 1979).
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federal discovery provisions as amended,37 especially since counsel's
mental impressions and documentation of witnesses' statements would
likely fall under the "work product" protection.38 Critics also fear the po-
tential for widespread abuse by corporations directing all employees to
channel reports and communications through corporate attorneys in or-
der to prevent subsequent disclosure. 9
The Harper & Row decision marked a departure from the federal
courts' consistent application of the "control group" test. It has not, how-
ever, been accepted as an adequate replacement for the "control group"
test.' 0
B. Federal Rule 501
The next significant development affecting the law of privileges as ap-
plied to the corporate client was the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975.-" Rule 501,"1 a general rule under which Upjohn was
decided, is the only enactment of the privilege provision in the federal
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
38. See 4 MOoRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 26-238 n.17.
39. See 572 F.2d at 609. See also Note supra note 9, at 766. Since the privilege keeps
certain relevant information undiscoverable, it must be strictly construed. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). It is inconceivable that courts would allow its application
to protect communications that have no legal significance other than that they were commu-
nicated to counsel or that counsel was in possession of the written documents.
40. Only one other case has extended the corporate attorney-client privilege to the same
degree as Harper & Row. See Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
41. FED. R. OF Evm., Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at FED. RULE EVID. RULE
501, 28 U.S.C.A.).
42. FED. R. EVID. 501 reads as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in ac-
cordance with State law.
This is the only evidentiary rule dealing with the subject of privileges. The second sen-
tence of the provision serves to distinguish certain cases where state law may govern. In
general, when in federal court, the federal common law of privileges will apply to federal
question cases while in diversity cases, where only state claims are raised, the state law of
privileges is applicable. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 445, 458 (N.D.
Cal. 1978). See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Where there is a federal
question with pendent state claims, the federal common law of privileges governs all claims
of privilege raised in the litigation. See 77 F.R.D. at 458.
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rules. The general rule was enacted in place of the thirteen specific rules
proposed by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee.43 After considera-
ble debate over the Court's proposals, Congress rejected reference to spe-
cific privileges. Instead, it chose to leave the law of privileges in its pre-
sent state to be developed under the principles of the common law, as
interpreted by the courts, in light of reason and experience.44
Particular congressional criticism was directed at the Advisory Com-
mittee's failure to define the "representative of the client" as applicable
to the attorney-client privilege. 45 The report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee termed this to be a "critical" issue for corporations and organ-
izations. 46 The Advisory Committee's preliminary drafts of proposed rules
included a rule on the attorney-client privilege.47 Within that rule, the
Advisory Committee initially endorsed the "control group" test by defin-
ing the representative of the client as "one having the authority to obtain
professional legal services and to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,
on behalf of the client. '4 8 However, the Supreme Court's four-to-four per
curiam affirmation of the Harper & Row decision did not endorse the"subject matter" test and indicated that a Court consensus in favor of
one definition of the "representative of the client" was unlikely.49 The
Advisory Committee then withdrew its proposed definition of the repre-
sentative of the client, indicating that "the matter is better left to resolu-
tion by decision on a case-by-case basis."5 Thus, the federal law of privi-
leges was left without a generally accepted rule of judicial construction
applicable for determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege in
the corporate context. The result was the Congressional mandate, as set
forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which the Upjohn Court inter-
preted as requiring a case-by-case determination of the particular facts
and circumstances in light of judicial reason and experience. 51
C. Post Rule 501 Analysis
After the enactment of Rule 501, federal courts did no more than give
"lip service" to the case-by-case analysis requirement when confronted
with the task of defining the scope of a corporation's attorney-client priv-
43. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 200 (2d ed. 1977).
44. Id. at 218-22.
45. Id. at 219.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 752.
48. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-44.
49. Id.
50. A. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 43, at 753. See 101 S. Ct. at 686.
51. 101 S. Ct. at 686.
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ilege. Whether out of a belief that predictability is essential52 or a judicial
preference for uniformity of result, the tendency of federal courts was to
try to adhere to clearly delineated tests already existing 3 or to formulate
new tests for broad application.54 Of the newly created tests, two have
been widely cited. Both appear to have had some influence on the Su-
preme Court's ultimate decision in Upjohn, although neither test was
cited expressly by the Court.
The decision by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith55 was the first attempt to devise a test that would address defi-
ciencies of earlier tests while attempting to achieve favorable results when
dealing with contemporary problems. In 1974 and 1975, Diversified had
been involved in litigation surrounding a proxy fight. That litigation dis-
closed the possible existence of a corporate "slush fund" used to bribe
purchasing agents of other business entities to whom Diversified sold
scrap metal. The corporation's Board of Directors retained a law firm to
make an investigation of the company's business practices in the context
of these disclosures.56
The subject matter of the law suit was Diversified's refusal to provide
third party access to the materials generated by counsel during this inter-
nal investigation and the corporation's reliance on the attorney-client
privilege. After finding the "control group test inadequate, ' 57 and the"subject matter" test susceptible to potential abuse,5 the court adopted
the following test:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communica-
tion if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction
52. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 762.
53. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979) (control group test); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) (control group test); SEC v. Cana-
dian Javelin, 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978) (combination of control group and subject
matter tests); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunsweg Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (combi-
nation of control group and subject matter tests); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977) (modified control group); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975) (modified control group); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975) (control group test).
54. See notes 55-67 infra and accompanying text.
55. 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
56. Id. at 600-01. For a review of the facts of this case and a thorough analysis of its
significance see Bitner, Circuits Grapple With Work Product Issues in Payment Probes,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 20, 1979, at 27, col. 1. See also Brown, supra note 4; Gerk, supra note 4;
Greenby, supra note 20.
57. 572 F.2d at 609.
58. Id.
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of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the cor-
poration could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communica-
tion is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the com-
munication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents. 9
In adopting this test, it is clear that the primary concerns of the court
were to facilitate the free flow of information to legal advisors ° in accord-
ance with the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, and to encourage
communications to lawyers made in a good faith effort to promote com-
pliance with law governing corporate activity."'
A similar but even less restrictive test was formulated in the antitrust
and patent case of In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation.2 When the de-
fendant-corporation objected to the use of the "control group" approach
for determining which employee communications could be protected by
the attorney-client privilege, 3 the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia emphasized the importance of examining the relevance" of the
communication to a particular legal problem.6 5 The court held that the
following requirements must be met before the attorney-client privilege
may be claimed for employee communications:
1) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must
have made a communication of information which was reasonably believed
to be necessary to the decision-making process concerning a problem on
which legal advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of securing
legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee must
have been related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment; and
59. Id. The test is basically a modification of the Harper & Row "subject matter" teat. It
was formulated by "Judge" Weinstein. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2 at
503-47, 49.
60. 572 F2d. at 609.
61. Id.
62. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
63. Id. at 381.
64. The court held that compliance with the relevancy requirement did not require that
the communication in fact contain information necessary to the decision making process for
a particular legal problem. The court required only a reasonable belief that the information
be necessary. The court also implied that both the status of employment and the nature of
the information may affect the determination of whether a reasonable belief exists. Id. at
385 n.10.
65. Id. at 385.
[Vol. 16:141
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4) The communication must have been a confidential one ....
The district court noted that this test looks at the subject matter of the
communication and the context in which it was made rather than the
status of the employee making the communication.67
III. Upjohn Co. v. United States: THE LATEST POSITION OF THE
SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court shed new light on the scope of the corporation's
attorney-client privilege in federal courts in Upjohn Co. v. United
States."" The case involved Upjohn's appeal from a ruling by the Sixth
Circuit that the attorney-client privilege protected only communications
made by the corporate control group, i.e., those officers and agents re-
sponsible for directing Upjohn's corporate counsel.69 The Supreme Court
firmly rejected the "control group" approach sanctioned by the Sixth Cir-
cuit and many other courts before it. Writing for eight members of the
Court,7 0 Mr. Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the narrow 'control group
test' . . . cannot, consistent with 'the principles of the common law as
interpreted in light of reason and experience,' ... govern the development
of the law in this area."7 The majority did not, however, take the oppor-
tunity to adopt one of the other tests that have been utilized by courts of
appeals,72 nor did it choose to set down a new rule or set of rules to gov-
ern questions in this area.73 Instead, the Court was content to limit its
66. Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 387.
68. 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981). For a short discussion of the treatment of this issue in state
courts see Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the
Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759, 762 n.24 (1971).
69. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979). For a short discussion of
the "control group" test, see notes 22-30 supra and accompanying text.
70. The decision in Upjohn was unanimous. Mr. Chief Justice Burger did, however, write
a concurring opinion to express his belief that the Court should establish a rule of general
application as a means of achieving predictability and certainty in this area of the law. 101
S. Ct. at 689 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
71. 101 S. Ct. at 686 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
72. 101 S. Ct. at 681. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Mere-
dith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487
(7th Cir. 1970).
73. 101 S. Ct. at 681. The Court used the "spirit of Fed. R. Evid. 501," the congressional
directive to determine the applicability of the privilege on a case by case basis, and its own
policy of deciding "concrete cases and not abstract propositions of law" to justify its refusal
to draft a set of rules. 101 S. Ct. at 681, 686. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
(1980); S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974).
The Court recognized that "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served,
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ruling to the concrete facts before it, holding that in this case the commu-
nications by all of the "corporate employees""4 involved were protected
from compelled disclosure by the corporation's attorney-client privilege.7 5
The attorney-client privilege issue arose when the Internal Revenue
Service brought a proceeding in Tax Court to enforce its summons issued
to Upjohn and the corporation's in-house counsel.76 The summons, issued
on November 23, 1976, directed the corporation and its in-house counsel,
Gerald Thomas, to appear before an officer of the IRS and give testimony
relating to the tax liability of Upjohn for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974.
The summons also demanded production of all corporate files which were
related to an investigation conducted under the suupervision of Mr.
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether par-
ticular discussions will be protected." 101 S. Ct. at 684. It further stated that "[a]n uncer-
tain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications
by the courts is little better than no privilege at all." Id. Notwithstanding this dicta, the
majority decision undermined the very attributes of a privilege it recognized as desirable.
Cf. 101 S. Ct. at 689 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (the Chief Justice called for articulation of a
standard to "govern similar cases and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising
them, and federal courts").
74. The Court limited the ruling to communications by corporate employees even though
some of the communications involved were between corporate counsel and individuals who
had formerly been employed by Upjohn Co. Upjohn argued that the privilege should apply
to communications by former employees concerning activities during their period of employ-
ment. Since the lower courts had not addressed this argument the Supreme Court declined
to consider its validity. 101 S. Ct. at 685 n.3. This argument may be considered on remand.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 681.
76. United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 USTC 83,597 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The summons
was issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7602, which provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such in-
quiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
Following Upjohn's refusal to comply with the terms of the summons, the IRS filed an en-
forcement petition pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). 78-1 USTC at 83,598.
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Thomas. The purpose of the investigation was to identify payments made
to employees of foreign governments and any political contributions made
by Upjohn or any of its affiliates since January 1, 1971.7
The files sought by the IRS contained the results of a "questionable
payments probe178 conducted by Mr. Thomas as Upjohn's in-house coun-
sel. This internal investigation was undertaken when the audit of one of
Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries identified payments by the subsidiary to the
employees of a foreign government, or to third parties believed to be act-
ing as intermediaries for these government employees, for the purpose of
securing government business.7 9 Thomas was one of the corporate repre-
sentatives initially privy to the auditor's report because of his position as
Upjohn's general counsel. Thomas was also the corporate secretary, a vice
president, a member of the board of directors and an officer of various
subsidiaries. He was aware that such corporate payments to foreign gov-
ernments could place an American corporation in violation of securities
laws, and the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission."0 Thomas was equally aware that the SEC had indicated a policy
of lenient treatment of corporations which voluntarily disclosed payments
of the type revealed by the audit."' Accordingly, after consultations with
the chairman of the board and outside counsel, Thomas conducted a fac-
tual investigation "to determine the natu're and extent of the questiona-
ble payments and to be in a position to give legal advice to the Company
with respect to the payments." 2
The investigation consisted of written questionnaires prepared by
Thomas and outside counsel regarding the alleged illegal payments.
These questionnaires were mailed by the chairman of the board to all
foreign general and area managers of the corporation," with directions
77. 78-1 USTC at 83,598. The summons directed that the records produced "should in-
clude but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Com-
pany's foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the
United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its sub-
sidiaries." Id.
78. The Federal magistrate coined the term "questionable payments." 78-1 USTC at
83,598.
79. Id. This type of investigation has been the source of frequent litigation of the attor-
ney-client privilege issue. See Bitner, supra note 56.
80. 78-1 USTC at 83,599; 600 F.2d at 1225.
81. 78-1 USTC at 83,599.
82. Id.
83. Id. A total of 53 Upjohn managers received questionnaires. Id. Also sent under the
Chairman's signature was a letter which noted, (1) the recent disclosure of possibly illegal
payments, (2) that management was in need of full information concerning any such pay-
ments and (3) that the corporation's legal counsel was conducting the investigation to deter-
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that all completed questionnaires be returned to Thomas.84 In addition,
Thomas personally interviewed all recipients of the questionnaire. Fi-
nally, Thomas and outside counsel interviewed some thirty-three other
employees, including former employees who had not received
questionnaires. 5
On March 26, 1976, after the initial investigation was completed,
Upjohn voluntarily made a disclosure report to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on Form 8-K.86 Contemporaneously with the SEC re-
porting, the corporation sent copies of Form 8-K to the IRS. The IRS
began its investigation at that point into the tax consequences of the pay-
ments which subsequently led to the November 23, 1976 summons.8 7
The summons specifically sought the written questionnaires which had
been returned to Mr. Thomas by the managers of Upjohn's foreign affili-
ates, as well as memoranda or notes of the interviews conducted with the
managers and other officers and employees of the corporation.88 Thomas
and the corporation refused to produce these documents on the grounds
that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
as well as the limited immunity provided an attorney's work product pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation.89 The Supreme Court agreed that "the
response to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to inter-
view . . . [were] communications by Upjohn employees" to counsel"'
mine the nature and magnitude of any payments made. The addressees were also instructed
to treat the investigation as "highly confidential" and not to discuss it with anyone other
than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing the necessary information. 101 S.
Ct. at 681.
84. 101 S. Ct. at 681.
85. Id. As to the former employees who were interviewed about their activities while em-
ployed by Upjohn, see note 74 supra and accompanying text.
86. 78-1 USTC at 83,599. This report disclosed "questionable payments" since January 1,
1971 totaling $2,710,000 in 22 of the 136 countries served by Upjohn. Id. A subsequent
amendment to Form 8-K revealed actual payments of approximately $4,400,000. 600 F.2d at
1225.
87. 78-1 USTC at 83,599.
88. Id. at 83,598. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. The company voluntarily
furnished the IRS with two schedules regarding the payments. One listed only $700,000 in
payments which Upjohn believed had an effect on its consolidated income tax returns. The
other less detailed schedule contained a country-by-country summary of approximately
$3,700,000 in additional payments which Upjohn claimed did not affect its tax liability. The
IRS claimed that this data was not sufficient to enable it to determine whether there were in
fact more questionable payments than those shown in the two schedules. 78-1 USTC at
83,599-600.
89. For a discussion of the "work product" issue in the Upjohn case, see 101 S. Ct. at 685-
90.
90. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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and thus protected from disclosure by the corporation's privilege. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority:
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel
for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to
secure legal advice from counsel .... Information, not available from upper-
echelon management, was needed to supply a basis for legal advise concern-
ing compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regula-
tions, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas.
The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees'
corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that
they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal
advice .... Pursuant to explicit instructions from the Chairman of the
Board, the communications were considered 'highly confidential' when
made... and have been kept confidential by the company.9 2
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE Upjohn DECISION
The significance of the decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States lies in
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the attorney's need to know and its
reduced concern for the burdens on the discovery process.9 3 The Court
recognized the traditional purpose of the privilege--"to encourage full
and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice."'94 As it had recently held in Trammel v. United
States,95 it went further, however, to point out that "'[tihe attorney-cli-
ent privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all
that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the profes-
sional mission is to be carried out.' "96 Thus, with this emphasis, the court
91. 101 S. Ct. at 686.
92. Id.
93. The Court balanced the interest in promoting freedom of consultation and full
disclosure between attorney and client against the interest in encouraging discovery of all
information relevant to particular litigation. 101 S. Ct. at 682-86. See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 503-44.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 682. The purpose of the privilege is clearly set forth in the following
statement-
To induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their later
disclosure is said by the courts and commentators to be a necessity. The social good
derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their cli-
ent is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the
evidence in specific cases.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291 at 545.
95. 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (privilege against adverse spousal testimony).
96. 101 S. Ct. at 682. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The
Court found support for this emphasis in Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
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held that "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of profes-
sional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information
to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." 7
Under this approach, which emphasizes the corporate attorney's "need
to know," the "control group" test was inadequate because it was too nar-
row in scope and because it "threaten[ed] the valuable efforts of corpo-
rate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law."9 The
Court noted that assuring attorney access to all of the information neces-
sary to responsible performance of his function" requires that the attor-
ney-client privilege protect communications of any employee in posses-
sion of the information. 10 Since the modern corporate structure makes it
impossible for the control level officers and agents to know everything
that the lawyers need to know, 0 1 the scope of the privilege cannot be
limited by the "control group" test, which "frustrates .. . [the privi-
lege's] very purpose. ' ' 0°
The Supreme Court was also impressed with the apparent fact that
Upjohn took the initiative in pursuing the "questionable payments
probe" as a means of voluntarily assuring compliance with law.'03 Cer-
tainly, this type of corporate activity is desired, if not essential, if we are
to achieve the social goals promoted by business and corporate regulation.
It was also noted that the complicated array of regulatory legislation
which confronts the modern corporation today requires the assistance of
learned and fully informed legal counsel, "particularly since compliance
with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter."104 However, ie
Court felt that the "control group" test frustrated these socially desirable
efforts of legal counsel because it had proven to be "difficult to apply in
practice." 0 5 Moreover, disparate lower court decisions which had at-
tempted to identify the corporate "control group" illustrated the unpre-
dictability of that test.' By sanctioning a broader scope of protection
97. 101 S. Ct. at 683.
98. Id. at 684.
99. Id. (citing ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 4-1,
which requires each lawyer to "hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client").
100. 101 S. Ct. at 683.
101. Id. (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 608-09).
102. 101 S. Ct. at 684.
103. Id. at 681. The Court noted that Upjohn had voluntarily reported the payments to
the SEC and the IRS.
104. Id. at 684. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41
(1978); Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901,
913 (1969).
105. 101 S. Ct. at 684.
106. Id.
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against forced disclosure of corporate communications, the Upjohn Court
facilitated the efforts of corporate counsel in ensuring client compliance
with the law.
The Court considered but dismissed two of the government's argu-
ments against expanding the scope of the corporation's privilege. First, it
was argued that a broad privilege was not necessary to encourage volun-
tary compliance with law. To the contrary, the government suggested that
"the risk of civil or criminal liability suffices to ensure that corporations
will seek legal advice in the absence of the protection of the privilege. '10 7
Rejecting this argument, the Court suggested that, even if it were true, it
ignored the fact that "the depth and quality of any investigations [under-
taken] to ensure compliance with law would suffer" in the absence of a
broad privilege.108 In addition, the Court stated that the argument was an
overstatement for "it applies to all communications covered by the privi-
lege" 0 whether involving a corporation or an individual. "[Y]et the com-
mon law recognized the value of the privilege in futher facilitating com-
munications"110 between an individual and his attorney even though that
individual was likewise subject to the risk of civil or criminal liability.
The second government argument rejected by the Court was that "to
extend the attorney-client privilege beyond the limits of the control group
test.., would entail severe burdens on discovery and create a broad 'zone
of silence' over corporate affairs.""' In the past, these factors had been
frequently cited to deny an extension of the privilege beyond the corpo-
rate "control group. 11 2 The courts that have expanded the scope of the
corporate privilege have had little difficulty dismissing this argument,1 3
however, and the Upjohn decision extinguished any flickering hope that
the "control group" test remains a viable justification for limiting the
scope of a corporation's privilege.
The Court pointed out that "the [attorney-client] privilege only pro-
tects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the
underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney ... ." 14
107. Id. at 684 n.2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 685.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227; Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d at 596. See also Note, supra note 9.
113. See, e.g., 572 F.2d at 606; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d at 487.
114. 101 S. Ct. at 685. The Court distinguished communications from underlying facts:
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A
fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different
19811
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Thus, the privilege does not make it possible for a party to conceal a fact
merely by revealing it to his lawyer.115 The Court agreed that the govern-
ment's discovery burden would be less severe if it was able to secure the
results of Upjohn's internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the
questionnaires and notes taken by the corporation's attorneys.",6 This
factor is particularly significant since the only other way for the govern-
ment to obtain the information would be to independently interview each
of the knowledgeable corporate agents who were located in several foreign
countries." 7 However, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted for the majority,"considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the
attorney-client privilege."" 8 Justice Rehnquist further noted that
"'[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to per-
form its functions . . . on the wits borrowed from the adversary.' """
These arguments were thus put to rest when the Court concluded that an
expansion of the privilege for corporate communications "puts the adver-
sary in no worse position than if the communications had never taken
place.1 20
V. THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL COURT AFTER Upjohn
It is unfortunate for practitioners and jurists who must struggle with
the delicate problem of defining the scope of a corporation's privilege that
the majority of the Supreme Court felt no compulsion to provide explicit
guidance for cases beyond the facts before it. 21 The position was reached
notwithstanding the Court's recognition that predictability and certainty
are essential to achievement of the goal of promoting corporate communi-
cations which facilitate corporate counsel's "need to know.' 1 22 The
Court's position in this regard differed from that of Chief Justice Burger.
Unlike the majority, which held that the mandate of Federal Rule of Evi-
thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, "What did you say or
write to the attorney"? but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his commu-
nication to his attorney.
Id. at 685-86 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
115. 101 S. Ct. at 686 (citing State v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580, 150 N.W.2d 387,
399 (1967)).
116. 101 S. Ct. at 686.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
120. 101 S. Ct. at 685.
121. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
122. Id.
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dence 501 required determination on a case by case basis, the Chief Jus-
tice opined that the Court had a special duty to clarify aspects of the law
of privileges due to the provisions of Rule 501.123
Whether or not Chief Justice Burger's assessment of the Court's duty is
accepted, it is clear that practical considerations require that the Court
should articulate some guideline which federal courts could then utilize
while defining the proper scope of a corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege. Such a standard was suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his con-
curring opinion in Upjohn:
A communication is privileged ... when ... an employee or former em-
ployee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regard-
ing conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The at-
torney must be one authorized by management to inquire into the subject
and must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the
following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has
bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences,
if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to
actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that
conduct.124
As recognized by the Chief Justice, this test would not cover the entire
spectrum of privileged communications. It is designed to serve only as a
starting point in the analysis.125
A test that might prove more useful in a general context can be gleaned
from the majority's observations in Upjohn. Implicit in their analysis is
the following standard: a communication is privileged when (1) it is made
by corporate employees to corporate counsel; (2) at the direction of cor-
porate superiors; (3) in order to secure legal advice from counsel; (4) the
communication must concern matters within the scope of the employee's
corporate duties; (5) the information sought must not be available from
upper-echelon management; (6) the information is needed to supply a ba-
sis for legal advice concerning compliance with law; (7) the employees
themselves must be sufficiently aware that they are being questioned so
the corporation can obtain legal advice; (8) the communication must have
been considered confidential when made; and (9) the information must
123. The Chief Justice analyzed the provisions in Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and
stated that the law of privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experi-
ence." 101 S. Ct. at 689 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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have been held confidential by the corporation.12 6 In Upjohn, the Court
held that the communications made by the corporation's employees to
counsel met the above criteria; the communications were therefore pro-
tected from compelled disclosure. 2 7 From this, it is safe to conclude that
other communications which meet the same criteria should be likewise
protected by the corporation's attorney-client privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Uphohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court provided little
overt assistance for corporate attorneys faced with the problem of ob-
taining information to assist in advising their corporate clients, and for
federal judges who must decide whether the information is protected
from forced disclosure. There is still no absolute test for determining
when a corporate communication falls within the corporation's protection
from compelled disclosure. The Court did refocus the primary considera-
tion to the attorney's "need to know," while de-emphasizing the interests
of discovery. The Court also put an end to any consideration of the "con-
trol group" test as a means of limiting the boundarie§ of the corporation's
privilege. In practice, or until Congress deems otherwise, the scope of the
corporation's privilege in federal court remains to be determined on a
case-by-case basis in light of developments in the common law. Such is
the mandate of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. This development of the-
common law in the lower federal courts will no doubt be influenced by
the test implicity articulated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn.
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127. Id.
* Member 1980-1981 Law Review staff and member of 1981 graduating class.
[Vol. 16:141
